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We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in social services catering to users
with varied levels of need. In the absence of price discrimination and centralized admission, the provider relies
on sharing information about wait times to improve welfare. We consider a stylized model with heterogeneous
users who differ in their private outside options: low-need users have an acceptable outside option to the
social service, whereas high-need users have no viable outside option. Upon arrival, a user decides to wait
for the service by joining an unobservable first-come-first-serve queue, or leave and seek her outside option.
To reduce congestion and improve social outcomes, the service provider seeks to persuade more low-need
users to avail their outside option, and thus better serve high-need users. We characterize the Pareto-optimal
signaling mechanisms and compare their welfare outcomes against several benchmarks. We show that if either
type is the overwhelming majority of the population, information design does not provide improvement over
sharing full information or no information. On the other hand, when the population is a mixture of the
two types, information design not only Pareto dominates full-information and no-information mechanisms,
in some regimes it also achieves the same welfare as the “first-best”, i.e., the Pareto-optimal centralized
admission policy with knowledge of users’ types.
Key words : information design; social services; Pareto improvement; congestion
1. Introduction
Social services often face the challenge of congestion due to their limited capacity relative to their
demand. The congestion partly stems from the inclusionary intent of such services: a toll-free road
is available to all citizens even those who can afford alternative tolled ones. A broad range of low-
and middle-income households are eligible to apply for public housing. How can a social service
provider reduce congestion and thus the efficiency loss associated with service delay?
In this context, the two controls commonly used for managing congestion, i.e., pricing and cen-
tralized admission control, are inapplicable due to fairness and implementation considerations.
However, the service provider may have control over information about the status of the system
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to be shared with users. Local traffic managers and public housing authorities have accurate infor-
mation about the level of congestion for their corresponding services. As such, the service provider
can leverage this informational advantage to persuade some of those with lower needs to forgo this
social service and reduce congestion in the system. In this paper, we study how effective such an
informational lever is.
To investigate the effectiveness of information design in improving welfare for a congested social
service, we develop a stylized model that captures the key features of such a system. We consider
a single server queueing system where users arrive according to a Poisson process and their service
times are i.i.d. and exponentially distributed. Upon arrival, each user decides to either wait for the
service by joining an unobservable queue or seek her outside option.1 To capture the disparity that
users face with regard to the quality of their outside options, we categorize users into two groups:
(1) high-need users that have no feasible outside option and (2) low-need users that have a viable
alternative. Both types incur higher waiting costs upon joining a longer queue. A high-need users
always joins as she does not have any other choice. However, upon arrival, a low-need user makes
a join or leave decision to maximize her expected utility. Even though an arriving user does not
observe the queue, her decision relies on her belief about the queue size based on the information
shared by the service provider.
We assume the service provider has complete information about the status of the queue which he
can share with the arriving user. However, sharing the information fully may lead to bad welfare
outcomes because a utility-maximizing user does not internalize the negative externality that she
imposes on others (Naor 1969). Instead, the service provider can use the lever of information
sharing to influence users’ beliefs about the queue size and consequently their decisions. We adopt
the framework of Bayesian persuasion or information design2 (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011) in
which the service provider commits to a signaling mechanism in response to which users follow an
equilibrium strategy. The welfare of each type is thus determined by the signaling mechanism and
the corresponding equilibrium response of the users. Because high-need users always join the queue,
the service provider does not need to know user types to implement a signaling mechanism.
Our analysis follows the standard approach (see e.g. Lingenbrink and Iyer (2019), Bergemann and
Morris (2016), Candogan and Drakopoulos (2019)) which allows us to only consider obedient binary
signaling mechanisms where upon the arrival of a user, the service provider makes a “ join” or “ leave”
recommendation and the user finds it incentive compatible to follow that recommendation. Further,
it builds on Lingenbrink and Iyer (2019) to establish an equivalence between the class of obedient
1We assume there is no abandonment.
2We use the terms Bayesian persuasion and information design interchangeably.
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binary signaling mechanisms and the set of steady state distributions that satisfy certain linear
constraints. (Lemma 1) To ensure welfare improvement for both types, we focus on Pareto-dominant
signaling mechanisms (Definition 1) and establish structural results for any such mechanisms. Under
mild assumptions on utility functions (Assumption 1), we show that any Pareto-dominant signaling
mechanism has a threshold structure. (Theorem 1)
With these structural results, we compare the optimal signaling mechanism against the bench-
marks of full information sharing and no information sharing. We focus on the special setting
in which both types have the same linear utility function. Our analysis reveals several intrigu-
ing insights into effectiveness of information design. First, there exists a signaling mechanism that
Pareto-dominates full information sharing unless full information is itself Pareto-dominant even
when the service provider is allowed to disregard user incentives. (Theorem 4) However, if the pop-
ulation is mostly comprised of low-need users the welfare gain due to information design is fairly
limited. (Proposition 1) This dichotomy stems from the intuition that in the absence of high-need
users, a low-need user cannot be persuaded to leave if the queue length falls below the threshold up
to which she would have joined under full information. On the other hand, when high-need users
are present it is possible to persuade more low-need users to leave. Second, there exists a signaling
mechanism that Pareto-dominates no information sharing only if the arrival rate of high-need users
does not exceed a threshold. However, if high-need users constitutes the overwhelming majority, then
interestingly, no information is Pareto dominant even when the provider is allowed to disregard user
incentives (Theorem 5). The main intuition behind this result is that with abundance of demand
from high-need users, the system is so congested that the type-L user does not need much persuasion
to choose her outside option over the social service. Conversely, if the system is not overcrowded
by high-need users, information design proves effective over sharing no information. Putting these
insights together, we conclude that signaling is particularly effective if the user population shows
sufficient heterogeneity.
To further study the power of information design, we compare its Pareto frontier with that of
a strong benchmark in which the service provider implements a Pareto dominant admission policy
disregarding the user’s incentives. Interestingly, we show that if the arrival rate of high-need users is
high, the two Pareto frontiers show considerable overlap (Propositions 2 and 3, and Figure 3). This
further illustrates the effectiveness of information design: any Pareto-dominant signaling mechanism
that belongs to the overlapping regions of the frontier achieves the same welfare outcomes as those
of an admission policy that can not only observe the user types, but also enforce the join or leave
decision without regard to their incentives. Further, in such overlapping cases, no user is indifferent
between their recommended action and the alternative, implying that signaling mechanism primarily
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plays the role of a co-ordination device. This is in contrast with usual persuasion settings, where
the optimal signaling mechanism extracts all user surplus for at least some signals.
In summary, our work investigates the effectiveness of information design as a potential approach
for reducing congestion in social services offered to users heterogeneous in their needs. Using a
stylized model, we show that by implementing a Pareto-dominant signaling mechanism, the service
provider can achieve Pareto improvement in the welfare by persuading more low-need users to seek
outside option, thereby reducing congestion. We also identify conditions under which information
design not only outperforms the simple mechanisms of full or no information sharing, but also
achieves the same welfare outcomes as centralized admission policies that know each user’s need for
the service.
1.1. Related Work
Our work relates to and contributes to several streams of literature.
Information Design: Like ours, in many other settings service providers and platforms have access
to more information than their customers. As such, informational aspects of service and platform
operations have been studied in many applications. Adopting the framework of Bayesian persuasion
(pioneered by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)), Lingenbrink and Iyer (2018) and Drakopoulos et al.
(2018) study effectiveness of information design for influencing the customers’ time of purchase in
order to maximize the platform’s revenue. Kremer et al. (2014) and Papanastasiou et al. (2017) focus
on information design in a sequential learning setting with the goal of maximizing social welfare.
In the context of misinformation on social platforms, Candogan and Drakopoulos (2019) study how
the platform can optimally signal the content accuracy while incentivizing desirable levels of user
engagement in the presence of positive network externalities. (See also Candogan (2019) that designs
optimal signaling mechanism for incentivizing product adoption on a social network.) Outside the
framework of Bayesian persuasion, Kanoria et al. (2017) show that a two-sided matching platform
can significantly improve welfare by hiding information about the quality of a user’s potential
partners. In another interesting direction, Nahum et al. (2015) show that in two-sided matching,
the presence of experts who can reveal information can lead to an inferior outcome for everyone in
two-sided matching even if the use of such experts is optional.
Closest to our setting is the recent work of Lingenbrink and Iyer (2019) that study optimal signal-
ing for services with unobservable queues. Even though our work builds on the machinery developed
in Lingenbrink and Iyer (2019), there are also key differences which we discuss next. Lingenbrink
and Iyer (2019) are concerned with maximizing the service provider’s revenue using information
sharing as well as static pricing. As such, the goal of an optimal signaling mechanism in that set-
ting is to persuade more customers to join the queue. However, in our setting the service provider
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uses information sharing mechanism to improve welfare outcomes by influencing low-need users’
decision in favor of leaving. Further, Lingenbrink and Iyer (2019) mainly focus on a setting with
homogeneous users whereas we study a settings with different user types. Relatedly, Anunrojwong
et al. (2019) study persuasion of non-expected-utility maximizing agents, and apply it to study
throughput maximization in queues where customers’ disutility depends on the variance of their
waiting-times.
Finally, Das et al. (2017) also study how optimal information sharing mechanisms can reduce
congestion in a traffic network when a user chooses a path among the set of paths some of which
have uncertain states. In particular, the authors consider a static setting where a continuum of users
simultaneously decide on the path they wish to take to minimize their own cost, and show that all
public signaling mechanisms yield the same outcomes as full information (or no information). Our
paper complements this work by considering a dynamic setting in which users of different types
sequentially arrive over time. Upon arrival of each user, the service provider sends a state-dependent
signal. We show that public signaling can be effective in improving welfare outcomes when compared
to special mechanisms of full information and no information.
Strategic Behavior in Queueing Systems: Following the seminal work of Naor (1969), a stream
of literature has focused on analyzing queuing systems where users are strategic. (See the survey
Hassin (2016) and references within.) By and large, the main focus in this line of work (Hassin
and Koshman 2017, Hassin 1986, Chen and Frank 2001) is on using the levers of pricing (either
static or state-dependent) and admission control rather than information sharing. Focusing on the
information sharing aspect (for an unobservable queue), Allon et al. (2011) consider a cheap talk
setting where the service provider does not have commitment power. Finally, as discussed above,
Lingenbrink and Iyer (2019) consider information design in conjunction with pricing in order to
maximize the service provider’s revenue.
Dynamic Allocation of Social Goods: Our paper is also related the literature on dynamic alloca-
tion of social goods such as public housing (Kaplan 1984) and donated organs (Agarwal et al. 2019).
Recently, Leshno (2017) and Arnosti and Shi (2017) consider settings where the user has a hetero-
geneous preference over arriving goods and thus she faces a trade-off between waiting longer and
accepting a less preferred good. (Similar trade-off exists in dynamic matching as studied in Doval
and Szentes (2018) and Baccara et al. (2018).) These papers focus on designing efficient allocation
mechanisms such as waitlist mechanisms. We complement this literature by studying the role that
information sharing can play in improving welfare for social services.
While our contribution is theoretical, there is also an extensive literature on practical aspects of
provision and prioritization of social services. For example, Brown and Watson (2018) examines the
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validity and reliability of a widely-used homelessness vulnerability assessment. Segall et al. (2016)
outlines criteria for kidney transplantation in elderly patients.
Finally, our work investigates the power of information design to reduce congestion in social ser-
vices, where the usage of monetary payments to shape agents’ incentives is either impractical or
unpalatable. As such, it is broadly related to the growing literature on mechanism design without
money. Motivated by wide-ranging applications, this stream of literature studies resource allocation
without relying on monetary payments. For examples of static settings, see Procaccia and Tennen-
holtz (2009), Prendergast (2017), Arnosti and Randolph (2020); dynamic settings are studied in
Balseiro et al. (2019), Gorokh et al. (2019), Feigenbaum et al. (2020).
2. Model
In the following, we describe a model of information design for improving welfare outcomes in a
queueing setting with heterogeneous users. Our model builds upon that of Lingenbrink and Iyer
(2019), who study revenue maximization in a related queueing setting.
Consider a service provider who provides a social service to a stream of users arriving over time.
Due to capacity constraints, the arriving users possibly wait in an unobservable queue for service,
where they are served on a first-come-first-serve (FCFS) basis by a single server. Each user’s service
time is independently and identically distributed as an exponential distribution with rate one.3
Arriving users must decide whether to join the queue and wait for the service or to leave for an
outside option. Upon joining, we assume there is no abandonment: if a user joins the queue she
will stay until service completion. To describe users’ utility, we start with discussing their outside
options. We model the users as belonging to one of two groups which differ in the quality of their
outside options. Specifically, we assume that each user is either a (1) high-need user, who has no
viable outside option, which we model by letting their utility for taking the outside option be −∞;
or a (2) low-need user who has a viable outside option whose utility we normalize to 0. We denote
a user’s type as H if they are high-need, and by L if they are low-need. We assume that users of
type i ∈ {H,L} arrive according to an independent Poisson process with rate λi, with λ= λL + λH
denoting the total arrival rate. To avoid trivialities, we assume λL > 0. In our analysis, we also
assume that λ≤ 1, to capture the setting where the social service is not under-capacitated.
On joining the queue to obtain service, each user receives a net utility composed of the benefit
from the social service and a cost of waiting until service completion. Formally, the utility function
of a type i∈ {L,H} user is given by ui :N0→R, where ui(n) denotes her utility on joining a queue
with n users already in system, either in queue or being served.4 We make the natural assumptions
that ui(0)> 0, and limk→∞ ui(k)< 0. Further we make the following assumption:
3Normalizing the service rate to one is without loss of generality.
4Here, N0 =N∪{0} denotes the set of non-negative integers.
Anunrojwong, Iyer, and Manshadi: Information Design for Congested Social Services
7
Assumption 1. The utility functions satisfy the following monotonicity assumptions:
1. For each type i∈ {H,L}, the utility function ui(n) is strictly decreasing in n.
2. The difference ∆uL(n), uL(n)−uL(n+ 1) is non-increasing in n.
We remark that the monotonicity assumption on the utility of both types is natural and it reflects
the fact that waiting for service completion imposes a waiting cost on the users. The second condition
requires that while each additional user ahead in queue imposes greater waiting costs on a type-L
user, the incremental cost decreases with more users ahead in queue. We note that the linear utility
function, i.e., uL(n) = 1− c(n+ 1) for some c > 0, satisfies both the conditions.5
We assume that the users are strategic and Bayesian in their joining decisions. Because high-need
users have no viable outside option, any such arriving user always joins the queue for service. On
the other hand, the low-need users may decide to leave for the outside option, based on their beliefs
about the queue state. Since the queue is unobservable to the users, the service provider seeks to
leverage his informational advantage to influence the low-need users’ decision, with the goal towards
improving welfare outcomes. To that end, the service provider commits to a signaling mechanism
as follows: the service provider selects a set of possible signals S, and a mapping σ :N0×S→ [0,1],
such that, if there are n users already in queue upon the arrival of a user, he sends a signal s ∈ S
to the user with probability σ(n, s)∈ [0,1]. (We require ∑s∈S σ(n, s) = 1 for all n.) Note that since
high-need users in our model have no viable outside option and hence always join the queue, the
service provider can implement a signaling mechanism without the knowledge of user types.
Given the signaling mechanism, we require the low-need users’ choices to constitute an equilib-
rium. Informally, the equilibrium requires that in the steady state that arises from the users’ actions,
each low-need user is acting optimally. To elaborate further, given the steady state distribution pi,
we require that a low-need user joins the queue upon receiving a signal s ∈ S if and only if her
expected utility from joining Epi[uL(n)|s] is greater than zero, the utility of her outside option. (We
assume that ties are broken in favor of joining; we note that due to negative externalities users in
the queue impose on each other, the welfare under other tie-breaking rules can only be better.)
Note that the steady state distribution pi itself is determined endogenously in equilibrium from
the users’ actions. To avoid unnecessary notational burden, we refrain from formally defining the
equilibrium for general signaling mechanisms, and point the reader to Lingenbrink and Iyer (2019).
Instead, using standard revelation principle style arguments (see e.g. Lingenbrink and Iyer (2019),
Bergemann and Morris (2016), Candogan and Drakopoulos (2019)) , one can show that it suffices
to consider obedient binary signaling mechanisms. These are the mechanisms where the signals are
5While our structural results rely only on Assumption 1, to derive further insights on the welfare outcomes under
different information sharing mechanisms, in Section 4, we assume that both user types’ utility function for joining
the queue is the same linear function.
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limited to “ join” and “ leave” — which we represent as 1 and 0 respectively — and for which in the
resulting user equilibrium, a high-need user always joins, and a low-need user joins upon receiving
signal 1 and leaves otherwise. We describe such mechanisms more formally next.
First note that a binary signaling mechanism can be described by {pn : n≥ 0}, where pn denotes
the probability that a type-L user receives the signal s = 1 ("join"), when the queue length is n
upon her arrival. Assuming that all users follow their recommendation, let pi = {pin : n≥ 0} denote
the resulting steady-state distribution. By elementary queueing theory, the steady state distribution
satisfies the following detailed-balance conditions (Gross et al. 2018):
pin+1 = (λLpn +λH)pin, for all n≥ 0. (1)
Given the steady-state distribution and using Bayes’ rule, an arriving type-L user receiving the
signal s= 1 ("join") believes the queue-length is n≥ 0 with probability pinpn/
∑
k∈N0 pikpk. Similarly,
an arriving type-L user receiving the signal s= 0 ("leave") believes the queue-length is n≥ 0 with
probability pin(1− pn)/
∑
k pik∈N0(1− pk).
For a type-L user, let UL(s, a) denote her expected utility upon receiving a signal s ∈ {0,1} and
choosing an action a∈ {join, leave}. Note that we have UL(s, leave) = 0. (Recall that type-L’s outside
option is normalized to zero.) On the other hand, we have
UL(1, join) =
∑
n∈N0
pinpn∑
k∈N0 pikpk
uL(n) =
∑
n∈N0(pin+1−λHpin)uL(n)∑
n∈N0(pin+1−λHpin)
,
UL(0, join) =
∑
n∈N0
pin(1− pn)∑
k∈N0 pik(1− pk)
uL(n) =
∑
n∈N0(λpin−pin+1)uL(n)∑
n∈N0(λpin−pin+1)
.
Here, the second equality in each line follows from the fact that λLpinpn = pin+1−λHpin and λLpin(1−
pn) = λpin−pin+1, which follow from the detailed-balance condition (1).
In an obedient binary signaling mechanism, a type-L user must find it incentive compatible to
follow the service provider’s recommendations. Thus, in such a mechanism, we must have the fol-
lowing obedience constraints: UL(1, join)≥UL(1, leave) = 0 and UL(0, join)≤UL(0, leave) = 0. This in
turn yields the following constraints on the steady-state distribution pi:
J(pi),
∞∑
n=0
(pin+1−λHpin)uL(n)≥ 0, (JOIN)
L(pi),
∞∑
n=0
(λpin−pin+1)uL(n)≤ 0 (LEAVE)
Using the preceding constraints, the following result, from Lingenbrink and Iyer (2019), establishes
a correspondence between obedient binary signaling mechanisms and a set of all distributions sat-
isfying obedience constraints. We omit the proof for brevity.
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Lemma 1 (Lingenbrink and Iyer (2019)). For any obedient binary signaling mechanism, the
steady-state distribution pi satisfies the following conditions:
1. Distributional constraints:
∑
n∈N0 pin = 1 and pin ≥ 0 for all n≥ 0;
2. Detailed-balance constraints: λHpin ≤ pin+1 ≤ (λH +λL)pin for all n∈N0; and
3. Obedience constraints (JOIN) and (LEAVE) as defined above.
Conversely, for any distribution pi satisfying the preceding sets of constraints, there exists an obedi-
ent binary signaling mechanism {pn : n≥ 0}, with pn = pin+1−λHpinλLpin whenever pin > 0 (and arbitrary
otherwise).
We let ΠSM denote the set of all distributions that satisfy the three sets of constraints mentioned
above. (Here, SM stands for signaling mechanism.) Here, the second constraints arise from the
detailed-balance conditions (1) and the fact that pn ∈ [0,1] for all n.
In addition to simplifying notation, the preceding result enables us to describe the user welfare
in an obedient binary signaling mechanism purely in terms of the resulting distribution pi ∈ΠSM. In
particular, for any pi ∈ΠSM, the welfare of type i users, denoted by Wi(pi), is given by
WL(pi) = λL
∞∑
n=0
pin
(
pin+1−λHpin
λLpin
)
uL(n) =
∞∑
n=0
(pin+1−λHpin)uL(n) = J(pi) (2)
WH(pi) = λH
∞∑
n=0
pinuH(n). (3)
Here, the first line follows from the fact that the arrival rate of type-L users is λL and that if the
queue-length is n, which occurs with probability pin in steady state, an arriving type-L user joins
the queue with probability (pin+1−λHpin)/λLpin and receives utility uL(n). Similarly, the second line
follows from the fact that a type-H user always joins upon arrival.
Since we focus on a social service setting, we seek to understand the effectiveness of information
design in improving the welfare outcomes for both types. In this context, the following notion of
Pareto dominance is natural:
Definition 1. For any two pi, pˆi ∈ ΠSM, we say pˆi Pareto-dominates pi, if Wi(pˆi) ≥ Wi(pi) for
i ∈ {L,H} with a strict inequality for at least one i. Further, we say a distribution pi ∈ ΠSM is
Pareto-dominant within the class ΠSM if and only if there exists no pˆi ∈ΠSM that Pareto-dominates
pi.
Hereafter, we frequently abuse the terminology to say an obedient binary signaling mechanism is
Pareto-dominant (within the class of such mechanisms), if the corresponding steady state distribu-
tion (as per Lemma 1) is Pareto-dominant within the class ΠSM.
For our comparative analysis, we look at two specific signaling mechanisms that capture the
two extremes of information sharing: (1) the full-information mechanism, denoted by fi, where the
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service provider always reveals the queue-length to an arriving user — the corresponding steady
state distribution pi ∈ ΠSM satisfies pin+1 = λpin for all n such that uL(n) ≥ 0, and pin+1 = λHpin
otherwise; and (2) the no-information mechanism, denoted by ni, where the service provider reveals
no information to the users. We characterize the corresponding steady state distribution in Lemma
4 in Section 4.
In the following, we also consider admission policies, where the service provider can enforce the
joining or leaving of any user, regardless of their type or their incentives. While such enforcement
is clearly practically infeasible, it serves as a benchmark against which the welfare outcomes of
signaling mechanisms can be compared. Formally, an admission policy can be described by the
class of distributions ΠAP that satisfy the distributional and the detailed-balance constraints from
Lemma 1, but need not satisfy the obedience constraints (JOIN) and (LEAVE). (Here, AP stands
for admission policy.) Analogous to Definition 1, we define Pareto-dominance within the class ΠAP.
Observe that ΠSM ⊆ ΠAP, i.e., any signaling mechanism is also an admission policy (one that also
respects user incentives), and hence any signaling mechanism pi ∈ ΠSM that is Pareto-dominant
within the class of admission policies ΠAP is also Pareto-dominant within the class of signaling
mechanisms ΠSM, but the converse may not hold. This observation motivates our choice of ΠAP as
a welfare benchmark.
Before we end this section, we note that both ΠAP and ΠSM are closed and convex, and the welfare
functions as defined in (2) and (3) are linear in pi. Thus, the sets {(WL(pi),WH(pi)), pi ∈ ΠSM} and
{(WL(pi),WH(pi)), pi ∈ΠAP} are also convex. As a consequence, it follows that any pˆi that is Pareto-
dominant within the class of signaling mechanisms ΠSM (or admission policies ΠAP), is the solution
to the (linear) optimization problem that maximizes the convex combination of the two user types’
welfare over the ΠSM (respectively, ΠAP). In particular, let W (pi, θ) = θWL(pi) + (1− θ)WH(pi) for all
pi ∈ΠAP. Then, any Pareto-dominant signaling mechanism is the solution to maxpi∈ΠSM W (pi, θ) for
some θ ∈ [0,1]. Similarly, any Pareto-dominant admission policy is the solution to maxpi∈ΠAP W (pi, θ)
for some θ ∈ [0,1]. Furthermore, for any Pareto-dominant pi, the specific θ ∈ [0,1] for which pi
maximizes W (·, θ) captures the relative importance the service provider ascribes to improving the
welfare of the two types. In this context, for a given θ, we refer to the admission policy that achieves
the maximum as the “first-best”, and the signaling mechanism that achieves the maximum as the
“second-best”.
3. Structural characterization
In this section, we provide structural characterizations of the Pareto-dominant signaling mechanisms
and admission policies. We use these structural characterization in Sections 4 and 5 to evaluate the
effectiveness of signaling mechanisms in improving welfare outcomes, and compare its performance
against admission policies and simple signaling mechanisms.
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Before we begin, for the sake of completeness, we state the following technical result that estab-
lishes the existence of Pareto-dominant signaling mechanisms and admission policies. The proof
follows from the observation that the sets ΠAP and ΠSM (or some relevant subsets) are compact, and
hence maximizers of W (pi, θ) over these sets exist for all θ ∈ [0,1]. The formal proof is provided in
Appendix A.
Lemma 2. There exist Pareto-dominant signaling mechanisms and admission policies.
Next, we define the following threshold structure among distributions pi ∈ΠAP.
Definition 2. We say a given pi ∈ΠAP has a threshold structure, if there exists an m∈N0∪{∞},
such that pik+1 = λpik for all k < m, and pik+1 = λHpik for all k > m. In such a setting, we say the
distribution pi has a threshold x=m+ a∈R+, where a= (pim+1−λHpim)/λLpim ∈ [0,1].
Informally, a distribution pi ∈ ΠAP has a threshold structure with threshold equal to x = m+ a ∈
[m,m+1], if an arriving type-L user is asked to join the queue with probability 1 for all queue-length
strictly less than m, asked to leave with probability 1 for all queue-lengths strictly greater than m,
and asked to join the queue with probability a ∈ [0,1] if the queue length is exactly m. (Note that
a threshold ∞ corresponds to the case where an arriving type-L user is asked to join regardless of
the queue-length.)
Our first result states that any Pareto-dominant signaling mechanism has a threshold structure.
The proof follows from a perturbation analysis similar to that in Lingenbrink and Iyer (2019): we
show that given any pi ∈ΠSM that does not have a threshold structure, one can perturb it to obtain
a pˆi ∈ΠSM that Pareto-dominates it.
Theorem 1. Any signaling mechanism pi ∈ ΠSM that is Pareto-dominant within the class ΠSM
has a threshold structure.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let pi ∈ ΠAP be such that there exists an m ≥ 0 with pim+1 < λpim and
λHpim+1 <pim+2. In words, this implies that under pi, an arriving type-L user is asked to leave with
positive probability if the queue length is m, and asked to join with positive probability if the queue
length is m+ 1. We now show that such a pi cannot be Pareto-dominant within ΠSM. We do this by
constructing an pˆi ∈ΠSM that Pareto-dominates pi.
Towards that end, consider the following perturbation of pi for small enough δ > 0:
pˆik =

pik if k <m+ 1;
pim+1 + δ
∑
n>m+1 pin if k=m+ 1;
pik(1− δ) if k >m+ 1.
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First, it is straightforward to verify that pˆi satisfies the detailed balance constraints in Lemma 1 for
all small δ > 0. In addition, we have
J(pˆi) =
∞∑
k=0
(pik+1−λHpik)uL(k) + δ
( ∑
k>m+1
pik
)
(uL(m)−λHuL(m+ 1))
− δpim+2uL(m+ 1)− δ
∑
k>m+1
(pik+1−λHpik)uL(k)
= J(pi) + δ ·
∑
k>m+1
pik · ( uL(m)−uL(k− 1)−λH(uL(m+ 1)−uL(k)) ) .
Now, as λH < 1, for any k >m+ 1, we have
uL(m)−uL(k− 1)−λH(uL(m+ 1)−uL(k))>uL(m)−uL(k− 1)−uL(m+ 1)−uL(k)
= (uL(m)−uL(m+ 1))− (uL(k− 1)−uL(k))
= ∆uL(m)−∆uL(k− 1)
≥ 0,
where we have used Assumption 1 in both inequalities. Specifically, the first inequality follows from
the fact that uL(k) is strictly decreasing in k and hence uL(m + 1) − uL(k) > 0, and the second
inequality follows from the fact that ∆uL(k) = uL(k)−uL(k+1) is non-increasing in k. Using this and
the fact that pim+2 > λHpim+1 ≥ 0, we obtain that J(pˆi)> J(pi)≥ 0. Hence the obedience constraint
(JOIN) holds for pˆi.
By similar algebraic steps, we have
L(pˆi) =L(pi)− δ ·
∑
k>m+1
pik · ( uL(m)−uL(k− 1)−λ(uL(m+ 1)−uL(k)) ).
Using the fact that λ≤ 1, by a similar argument as before, we obtain that the parenthetical term
is non-negative, and hence L(pˆi)≤L(pi)≤ 0. Thus, the obedience constraint (LEAVE) also holds for
pˆi. Taken together, this implies we have pˆi ∈ΠSM.
Next, note that
WH(pˆi) = λH
∞∑
n=0
pˆinuH(n)
=WH(pi) +λHδ ·
( ∑
k>m+1
pik · (uH(m+ 1)−uH(k))
)
.
Since uH(k) is non-increasing in k, we obtain WH(pˆi) ≥WH(pi). Finally, we have WL(pˆi) = J(pˆi) >
J(pi) =WL(pi). Thus, we obtain that pˆi Pareto-dominates pi.
From the above, we conclude that for any Pareto-dominant signaling mechanism pi ∈ΠSM, it must
be the case that whenever there exists an m≥ 0 with pim+1 < λpim, we have pim+2 = λHpim+1. This
implies that pi must have one of the following two structures:
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1. for all m≥ 0, we have pim+1 = λpim; OR
2. there exists an m≥ 0 such that pik+1 = λpik for k <m, pim+1 <λpim and pik+1 = λHpik for k >m.
In the first case, we have type L users being asked to join the queue for all queue length, implying
that pi trivially has a threshold structure (with threshold equal to ∞). In the second case, the type
L users are asked to join with probability 1 for queue-lengths strictly less than m and asked to
leave with probability 1 for queue-lengths strictly greater than m. Again, this implies a threshold
structure for pi, with threshold in the interval [m,m+ 1]. 
Furthermore, using the same argument as above, we obtain that the Pareto-dominant admission
policies also have a threshold structure. We omit the proof for brevity.
Theorem 2. Any admission policy pi ∈ΠAP that is Pareto-dominant within the class ΠAP has a
threshold structure.
Having established the threshold structure of any Pareto-dominant distribution (either within ΠAP
or ΠSM), we next state another key structural property of Pareto-dominant distributions within
ΠSM. In particular, we show that in any Pareto-dominant pi ∈ ΠSM that is not Pareto-dominant
within ΠAP, the obedience constraint that binds is the constraint (LEAVE). The intuition behind
this result lies in the observation, common in many congested service systems, that type-L users
do not internalize the negative externalities they impose on other users (both type-L and type-H)
by joining the queue. Hence, the type-L users are naturally more inclined to join the queue than
leave, and the challenge in information sharing is in ensuring that when the type-L users are asked
to leave, they find it incentive compatible to do so.
Theorem 3. Given any Pareto-dominant signaling mechanism pi ∈ΠSM, either it is (1) Pareto-
dominant within the class ΠAP of admission policies or (2) the obedience constraint (LEAVE) binds,
i.e., L(pi) = 0.
The proof of the preceding theorem relies on the following lemma which states that for any Pareto-
dominant distribution (either within ΠAP or ΠSM), the threshold must be less than that under the
full-information mechanism (fi). Note that the full-information threshold, which we denote by mfi,
is the smallest integer k for which uL(k)< 0.
Lemma 3. For any Pareto-dominant pi either within the class ΠSM or within ΠAP, the threshold
must be less than or equal to the full-information threshold mfi.
The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix A. The above lemma also proves useful in Section 4
where we study the effectiveness of signaling mechanisms by comparing their welfare outcomes
against those of the full-information mechanism. With the lemma in place, we are now ready to
prove the theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 3. Let pi be Pareto-dominant within the class ΠSM. By Lemma 3, pi has a
threshold structure with threshold smaller or equal to mfi. This in turn implies that J(pi)> 0, as
a type-L user always receives non-negative utility upon joining the queue, and receives a positive
utility if the queue is empty (which occurs with positive probability).
Now, assume for the sake of contradiction that L(pi)< 0 and pi is not Pareto-dominant within the
class ΠAP. This implies that there exists an admission policy pˆi ∈ΠAP that Pareto-dominates pi. In
particular, we have Wi(pˆi)≥Wi(pi) for i∈ {H,L}, with at least one inequality strict.
Next, let p˜i= (1− )pi+ pˆi for some ∈ (0,1] to be chosen later. By convexity of ΠAP, we have p˜i ∈
ΠAP. Furthermore, by linearity, we have J(p˜i) = (1− )J(pi)+ J(pˆi) and L(p˜i) = (1− )L(pi)+ L(pˆi).
Since J(pi)> 0 and L(pi)< 0, for all small enough  > 0 we have J(p˜i)≥ 0 and L(p˜i)≤ 0. Thus, the
obedience constraints (JOIN) and (LEAVE) hold for p˜i, and hence p˜i ∈ΠSM. Finally, again by linearity,
we have
WL(p˜i) = (1− )WL(pi) + WL(pˆi)≥WL(pi)
WH(p˜i) = (1− )WH(pi) + WH(pˆi)≥WH(pi),
with at least one inequality strict. Thus, we obtain that p˜i Pareto-dominates pi, which contradicts
our assumption that pi is Pareto-dominant within the class ΠSM. 
In concluding this section, we note that preceding result raises the intriguing possibility of the
existence of a signaling mechanism that is Pareto-dominant not only within the class ΠSM of signaling
mechanisms, but also within the broader class ΠAP of admission policies. For any such mechanism,
it follows that under a practically infeasible setting where the service provider observes the types of
users and is allowed to enforce the joining and leaving of users without regard to their incentives, he
cannot jointly improve both types’ welfare. Put differently, the existence of such mechanisms also
implies the existence of admission policies where the type-L users’ incentive constraints are satisfied
for “free”.
A trivial instance of such a scenario can arise, e.g., in cases where λH is large enough, and the
admission policy always bars type-L users from joining the queue. First, such an admission policy
must be Pareto-dominant, as any other policy that lets some type-L users in would necessarily
reduce the welfare of the type-H users. Furthermore, such an admission policy can be implemented
as a no-information mechanism, which satisfies obedience constraints as congestion in the queue
with just the type-H users makes joining undesirable for the type-L users. Excluding such trivial
scenarios, a natural question is whether there exist signaling mechanisms that do not exclude any
types, but are still Pareto-dominant within the class of admission policies ΠAP. In Section 5, under
a linear utility assumption, we show that indeed such mechanisms exist.
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4. Mechanism Comparisons
Having characterized the structure of Pareto-dominant signaling mechanisms, in this section, we
compare such mechanisms against various benchmarks in two different settings. First, in Section 4.1,
we consider the homogeneous setting where all users have type L, i.e., λH = 0.6 Then, in Section 4.2,
we consider the heterogeneous setting with both types of users present. As we discuss below, the two
settings exhibit striking contrast in the effectiveness of signaling mechanisms for welfare improve-
ment.
In light of Theorems 1 and 2, for ease of presentation, we use the following simplified notations
for a threshold policy: For x ∈R+, the threshold policy x is an admission policy that gives rise to
a steady state distribution pix ∈ΠAP that has a threshold structure, as defined in Definition 2, with
threshold x. For such a policy, with a slight abuse of notation, for i ∈ {L,H} we denote Wi(pix)
simply by Wi(x). We do the same for J(pix) and L(pix).
4.1. Homogeneous Users
We start our comparative studies by analyzing the special case of homogeneous users (λH = 0).
Observe that in this single-type setting, Pareto-dominance is equivalent to optimality, in terms
of maximizing the welfare of type-L users. Consequently, we let sm denote the optimal signaling
mechanism, the one that maximizes the welfare of type-L users.
In the following proposition we compare the optimal signaling mechanism sm with the full-
information extreme (fi). With a slight abuse of notation, for µ ∈ {fi, sm}, we denote the WL(µ)
the type-L welfare under mechanism µ. We have the following result, whose proof is provided in
Appendix B.
Proposition 1. In the homogeneous setting, we have
WL(fi)≤WL(sm)≤ αfi ·WL(fi),
where αfi ,
(∑mfi
n=0 λ
n
L
)/(∑mfi−1
n=0 λ
n
L
)≤ 1 + 1/mfi, and mfi is the full-information threshold.
The preceding theorem states that in the homogeneous setting, signaling mechanisms are not
very effective in improving the welfare beyond that achieved by the full-information mechanism. To
gain some intuition, observe that in general Bayesian persuasion settings, the performance gains are
typically achieved by pooling, in the persuaded agents’ beliefs, the “good” and the “bad” states of
the system. However, in a queueing setting, the linear nature of the underlying Markovian system
precludes any such simple pooling of states in the agents’ belief: the only way for the system to
6 The homogeneous setting where all users have type H is uninteresting from the point of design, as all users join the
queue regardless of their information due to no viable outside option.
Anunrojwong, Iyer, and Manshadi: Information Design for Congested Social Services
16
reach a bad state (one with long queue-length) is by progressing through all intermediate queue-
lengths. Because of this, agents are not easily persuaded. Formally, the proof proceeds by showing
that a threshold mechanism with threshold x≤mfi − 1 will not be incentive compatible: for such
a mechanism, a type-L user on receiving the signal “ leave” will realize the queue length is below
mfi, and hence will join the queue, implying the (LEAVE) constraint is violated. Thus, any small
improvement in welfare over fi stems from the structure of sm, which may sometimes ask type-L
users to leave when queue-length equals mfi− 1.
4.2. Heterogeneous Users
Next we proceed to a setting where the population is a mixture of the two types. Note that in this
case, we have two objectives, namely, the welfare of both types. As discussed before, to examine the
effectiveness of information design in improving the welfare of both types, we focus on the notion
of Pareto dominance. In the following, we draw comparisons between Pareto-dominant optimal
signaling mechanisms with the extreme forms of sharing information, i.e., full information and no
information.
To gain comparative insights, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. For each user type i ∈ {L,H}, the utility upon joining the queue, with n users
already present, is given by ui(n) = 1−c(n+1), where c∈ (0,1) is the waiting cost per each additional
user ahead in the queue.
The assumption of linear utility is common in the literature, and is made primarily for technical
convenience. On the other hand, the assumption that the utility functions of the two user types
are the same needs some justification. First, note that since we focus on the notion on Pareto-
dominance, each users’ utility can be scaled by an arbitrary positive number without any effect on
our analysis. Thus, the main import of the assumption is that the two user types place the same
relative weights on the value of service and the cost of waiting. We believe this assumption enables
us to neatly isolate the effects of heterogeneity of the users’ outside options.
With this assumption in place, our first result compares the power of information design against
the full-information benchmark.
Theorem 4. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then, we have either
1. the full-information mechanism fi is Pareto-dominant within the class of admission policies
ΠAP; OR
2. there exists a signaling mechanism that Pareto-dominates the full-information mechanism.
Further, the first case occurs if and only if WL(mfi)>WL(mfi− 1)
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To understand the implications of the preceding result, consider an admission policy with threshold
x≤mfi. As x increases, the more type-L users are served by the service provided, increasing their
utility. At the same time, the negative externality each type-L user imposes on other type-L users
increases as x increases. (This is in addition to the negative externalities imposed on type-H users.)
The preceding result states that for the full-information mechanism to be Pareto-dominant, the
gains from serving more type-L users must dominate the negative externalities they impose on others
(which is succinctly captured by the conditionWL(mfi)>WL(mfi−1)). This occurs for instance when
the arrival rate of type-L users is small. Conversely, if serving more type-L users imposes greater
negative externality on other type-L users, our result states that information design can leverage
this to improve the welfare of both types over the full-information mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that the full-information
mechanism, with threshold mfi is Pareto-dominant within the class ΠAP of admission policies if and
only if WL(mfi) >WL(mfi − 1). Subsequently, we show that when this condition fails, there exists
a signaling mechanism pi ∈ ΠSM that Pareto-dominates the full-information mechanism. We begin
with the first step.
SupposeWL(mfi)>WL(mfi−1). From Lemma 6,WL(k) is unimodal in k ∈N0, withWL(k) increas-
ing in k until reaching a maximum, and then decreasing. This implies that WL(k) <WL(mfi) for
all k <mfi. Furthermore, from Lemma 6, we also obtain that WL(·) is monotone between integers.
Hence, we conclude that for all 0 ≤ xˆ < mfi, we have WL(xˆ) <WL(mfi). As Lemma 3 implies that
any Pareto-dominant admission policy must have a threshold less than or equal to mfi, we obtain
that the full-information mechanism, with threshold mfi, is Pareto-dominant within the class ΠAP
of admission policies.
For the converse, suppose the full-information mechanism is Pareto-dominant within the class of
admission policies ΠAP. Consider the admission policy with threshold mfi − 1. From Lemma 6, we
have WH(mfi− 1)>WH(mfi). Since the full-information mechanism is Pareto-dominant within ΠAP,
we must have WL(mfi)>WL(mfi− 1).
To complete the proof, suppose WL(mfi) ≤WL(mfi − 1). Consider a threshold policy x ∈ (mfi −
1,mfi). We have the following expression for L(x):
L(x) = λL
(
pimfi−1(mfi−x)uL(mfi− 1) +
∞∑
k=0
pimfi+kuL(mfi + k)
)
.
Since uL(mfi − 1) ≥ 0 and uL(mfi + k) < 0 for all k ≥ 0, we obtain for all large enough x ∈ (mfi −
1,mfi), we have L(x) < 0. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that J(x) ≥ 0. Thus, for large
enough x ∈ (mfi − 1,mfi), the threshold policy x is a signaling mechanism. Using Lemma 6 again,
we have WL(x) ≥min{WL(mfi − 1),WL(mfi)} = WL(mfi). By a stochastic dominance argument, we
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have WH(x)>WH(mfi) for x ∈ (mfi− 1,mfi). Thus, for large enough x ∈ (mfi− 1,mfi), the signaling
mechanism with threshold x Pareto-dominates the full-information mechanism. 
Next, we discuss our second benchmark, i.e., sharing no information. Before proceeding, we first
characterize the steady-state distribution under the no-information mechanism (ni).
Lemma 4. For p ∈ [0,1], let pi(p) ∈ ΠAP be given by pin(p) = (1 − λLp − λH)(λLp + λH)n. Then,
the steady state distribution under the no-information mechanism ni is given by pi(pni) ∈ ΠSM, for
pni ∈ [0,1] that satisfies the following conditions:
1. if WL(pi(1))> 0 then pni = 1;
2. if WL(pi(0))< 0 then pni = 0;
3. otherwise, pni ∈ (0,1) satisfies WL(pi(pni)) = 0.
Here, pni ∈ [0,1] denotes the probability under the no-information mechanism that a type-L user joins
the queue upon arrival.
The proof of the preceding lemma is presented in Appendix B. Using this characterization, we
compare the effectiveness of information design against the no-information benchmark.
Theorem 5. Suppose Assumption 2 holds.
1. For λH ∈ [1− c,1], the no-information mechanism ni is Pareto-dominant within the class ΠSM
of signaling mechanisms, as well as within the class ΠAP of admission policies.
2. For λH ∈ (0,1 − c), there exists a signaling mechanism that Pareto-dominates the no-
information mechanism.
The preceding result neatly breaks the analysis into two cases, depending on the magnitude of the
arrival rate of type-H users. In the first case, when the arrival rate of type-H users is high, even if
no other type-L users join the queue, the outside option is more desirable for a type-L user. In other
words, the type-L user does not need much persuasion to forego the social service and avail the
outside option. In such instances, any information shared by the service provider would only induce
some type-L user to join the queue and hence reduce type-H users’ welfare. On the other hand,
when the system is not already overwhelmed by type-H users, information design proves effective
in improving welfare of both types over the no-information mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 5. First, suppose λH ∈ [1− c,1), and consider the admission policy A where
no type-L users are admitted into the queue. Under such policy, the steady state distribution piA is
that of the M/M/1 queue with arrival rate λH, and hence, we have piAn = (1−λH)λnH for all n∈N0.
From this, we obtain than WL(piA) = 0 (since all type-L users are made to avail the outside option),
and WH(piA) = 1− c1−λH ≤ 0.
Now, consider any other admission policy, where at least some fraction of type-H users are admit-
ted into the queue. Using a coupling argument, it is straightforward to show that the resulting
Anunrojwong, Iyer, and Manshadi: Information Design for Congested Social Services
19
steady-state distribution pˆi stochastically dominates pi. Since uH(n) is strictly decreasing in n, this
further implies that WH(pˆi) < WH(piA). Hence, it follows that the admission policy A is Pareto-
dominant within the class ΠAP.
Next, we show that the admission policy A can be implement as the no-information mecha-
nism, under which type-L users never join the queue. This follows immediately from the fact that
L(piA) =
∑
n∈N0(λpi
A
n − piAn+1)uL(n) = λL
∑
n∈N0 pi
A
n uH(n) = (λL/λH)WH(pi
A) < 0. Here, the second
equality follows from the fact that for piA, piAn+1 = λHpiAn , and that uL(n) = uH(n) for all n∈N0 from
Assumption 2. This proves the first statement of the theorem.
For the second part of the theorem, suppose λH ∈ [0,1− c). It is straightforward to verify that,
1. if λ = λH + λL ≤ 1− c, then under no-information, type-L users join with probability 1. The
steady-state distribution is pin = (1−λ)λn for all n≥ 0;
2. if λH < 1− c < λ, then under no information, type-L users join with probability pni = 1−c−λHλL ∈
(0,1). The effective arrival rate into the queue is λ1pni +λ2 = 1− c. The steady state distribution is
pin = c(1− c)n for n≥ 0.
In the first case, the steady-state distribution pi has a threshold structure with threshold equal to
infinity. Since the threshold is greater than mfi, Lemma 3 implies that pi is not Pareto-dominant
within ΠSM. In the second case, the steady-state distribution pi does not have a threshold struc-
ture, and by Theorem 1, we conclude that pi is not Pareto-dominant within ΠSM. Thus, in both
cases, we obtain that there exists a signaling mechanism that Pareto-dominates the no-information
mechanism. 
5. Achieving First Best
Having compared the effectiveness of information design against those of the two extreme signaling
mechanisms, we now investigate its limitations. Specifically, in this section, we compare signaling
mechanisms against Pareto-dominant admission policies, and ask how limiting the requirement of
ensuring obedience constraints is in terms of welfare improvement.
To better study this question, we consider the problem of maximizing the weighted welfare
W (pi, θ) = θWL(pi)+(1−θ)WH(pi), both over the class of admission policies and the class of signaling
mechanisms. Note that, due to convexity of ΠAP and ΠSM, all Pareto-dominant admission policies
and signaling mechanisms can be obtained as the maximizer for some θ ∈ [0,1]. As we mention in
Section 2, the specific θ for which a Pareto-dominant mechanism (or an admission policy) maximizes
W (pi, θ) captures the relative weight placed by the service provider in improving either types welfare.
For notational convenience, for any θ ∈ [0,1], we let sm(θ) denote the Pareto-dominant mechanism
that maximizes W (pi, θ) over pi ∈ ΠSM, and ap(θ) denote the admission policy that does the same
over ΠAP.
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As we discussed in the conclusion of Section 3, Theorem 3 raises the possibility that there exists θ ∈
[0,1] such that sm(θ) = ap(θ). The main point we make in this section is that, remarkably, for a wide
range of θ, sm(θ) = ap(θ), i.e., the signaling mechanism sm(θ) is Pareto-dominant within the class
of admission policies. We have the following proposition, whose proof is provided in Appendix C.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 2 holds.
1. For λH ∈ [1− c,1], the set of Pareto-dominant signaling mechanisms {sm(θ) : θ ∈ [0,1]} is the
same as the set of Pareto-dominant admission policies {ap(θ) : θ ∈ [0,1]}.
2. For each λH < 1− c, there exists a θ(λH)> 0 such that the set of θ for which sm(θ) = ap(θ) has
the form [θ(λH),1]. (We allow θ(λH)> 1, in which case the interval is empty.)
The preceding result has an interesting implication about the role of information design when
signaling mechanisms achieve Pareto-dominance over ΠAP. Note that in such cases, neither obedience
constraint binds, since sm(θ) = ap(θ). Thus, the obedience constraints impose no limitations on the
service provider. In such cases, information design plays solely the role of a co-ordination device,
directing some type-L users away from the queue and others to join the queue. In neither instance the
user is indifferent between the recommended action and the alternative. This is unlike what happens
in typical persuasion settings, where optimality requires indifference for at least some signals.
We also note that the two cases of the proposition are exactly the same as that of Theorem 5.
In particular, when no-information mechanism is Pareto-dominant, the set of Pareto-dominant sig-
naling mechanisms is same as the set of Pareto-dominant admission policies. Put differently, in
instances where signaling mechanisms lack the power of admission policies, no-information is Pareto-
dominated by some signaling mechanisms.
Finally, the equivalence of sm(θ) and ap(θ) is also appealing from an implementation point of
view: the service provider can implement a signaling mechanism without the knowledge of user
types. However, under an admission policy, the service provider observes the type of each arriving
user and makes join and leave decision on her behalf.
We illustrate the qualitative insights of the preceding proposition along with those of Theorems 4
and 5 via numerical examples presented in Figure 1. Here we plot the welfare of Pareto-dominant
signaling mechanisms and admission policies for different values of λL ∈ {0.13,0.20,0.30}, and c=
0.15. We fix λ = 1 in each case, to study the extreme setting where the service capacity exactly
matches the total arrival rate. For each value of λL, we also plot the full-information mechanism
(fi) and the no-information mechanism (ni). First, observe that for λL = 0.13, we have λH > 1− c,
and hence the first case of Theorem 5 applies. Thus, we observe that the no-information mechanism
(ni, green square) is Pareto-dominant. On the other hand, we observe that the full-information
mechanism (fi, green star) is Pareto-dominated by a signaling mechanism (green cross). Further,
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Figure 1 Welfare of Pareto-dominant signaling mechanisms and admission policies for λL ∈ {0.13,0.20,0.30}, λH =
1−λL and c= 0.15. Here, green (dashes) represents λL = 0.13, red (dots-dashes) represents λL = 0.20, and
blue (dots) represents λL = 0.30. Further, circles (◦) represent dominant admission policies (ap), crosses (×)
represent dominant signaling mechanisms (sm), star (?) represents the full-information mechanism (fi), and
square () represents the no-information mechanism (ni). (The no-information points for λL ∈ {0.2,0.3}
overlap, and so do those corresponding to signaling mechanisms and admission policies for each fixed λL.)
note that as established in the first case of Proposition 2, ap(θ) = sm(θ) for θ ∈ [0,1]. On the other
hand, for the other two values of λL, we see that the no-information mechanism achieves zero welfare
for both types, and is Pareto-dominated in the class of signaling mechanisms. Finally, we observe
that as the proportion λL of users with viable outside option increases, the welfare of both user
types increases.
We complement the findings of Proposition 2 with numerical computations presented in Figure 2.
Here, we plot the welfare of the signaling mechanism sm(θ), the admission policy ap(θ) and the
full information mechanism fi for θ ∈ {0,0.5,1}, c = 0.15, and λ = 1. Note that θ = 0 and θ = 1
correspond to the extreme cases where the service provider seeks to maximize the welfare of the one
type, perhaps at the expense of the other. The case θ= 0.5 corresponds to the case where the service
provider values the two types equally. Together, these three cases provide a representative account
of the service provider’s potential objectives for welfare improvement. In these figures, in the region
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Figure 2 Welfare of the Pareto-dominant signaling mechanism sm(θ), the Pareto-dominant admission policy ap(θ),
and the full-information mechanism fi for θ ∈ {0,0.5,1}. Here λL = 1−λH, and c= 0.15.
right of the green line, we have λH > 1− c. Thus, as shown in Proposition 2, we have that sm(θ) =
ap(θ). For θ ∈ {0.5,1}, we see that even for some values of λH < 1− c, the two are equal. Finally,
we note that as λH→ 0, we approach the homogeneous setting, and as shown in Proposition 1, we
observe the performance of the signaling mechanism sm(θ) approach that of the full-information
mechanism in each case. We formalize these observations in the following proposition, whose proof
is provided in Appendix C.
Proposition 3. Suppose λ= λH +λL = 1. Under Assumption 2, we have:
1. sm(0) = ar(0) if and only if λL ∈ [0, c].
2. sm(1/2) = ar(1/2) if and only if λL ∈
[
0,min
(
c
1−c ,1
)]
.
3. sm(1) = ar(1) if and only if λL ∈
[
0,min
(
2−2ck∗
ck∗(k∗−1) ,
c
1−ck∗
)]
where k∗ =
⌈
4−c−
√
8+c2
2c
⌉
is the
smallest positive integer such that c
1−ck ≥ 2−2c(k+1)c(k+1)k .
Finally, in Figure 3, we plot for each c ∈ {0.12,0.24}, the values of (θ,λH) for which the Pareto-
dominant admission ap(θ) is the same as the Pareto-dominant signaling mechanism sm(θ). In other
words, for these values, information design plays mainly the role of a co-ordination device, inducing
users to co-ordinate towards a better welfare outcome. In particular, neither obedience constraints
bind for such values of (θ,λH). Observe that, as shown in Proposition 2 and 3, for any fixed λH, the
values of θ for which this holds is an interval of the form [θ(λH),1]. In particular, for λH > 1− c,
this is the entire interval [0,1]. Conversely, for small enough values of λH, i.e., as we approach the
homogeneous setting, we observe that this set is empty. For any fixed intermediate value of λH,
we note that as θ increases, the threshold value in the Pareto-dominant mechanism sm(θ) = ap(θ)
increases; as more weight is placed on type-L users’ welfare, the Pareto-optimal signaling mechanism
asks type-L users to join the queue for a larger range of queue-length values. We also note that the
for any fixed θ, the values of λH for which sm(θ) = ap(θ) is fairly complex, with it being an union of
two intervals for some values of θ.
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Figure 3 Regions of the (θ,λH) plane for which sm(θ) = ap(θ), i.e., the signaling mechanism sm(θ) is Pareto-dominant
within ΠAP. The colors represent the value of the threshold in ap(θ), i.e., map(θ).
6. Conclusion
Social services often share two common features: they have limited capacity relative to their demand,
and they aim to serve users with varied levels of needs. Reducing congestion for such services using
price discrimination or admission control is not feasible in this setting. However, the service provider
can use its informational advantage, about service availability and wait times, to influence users
decisions in seeking the service by choosing what information to reveal. How effective will such a
lever be? Our work seeks to answer this question. Adopting the framework of Bayesian persuasion,
we study information design in a queuing system that serves users who are heterogeneous in their
need for the service. We show that, by and large, information design provides a Pareto-improvement
in welfare of all user types when compared to simple mechanisms of sharing full information or no
information. Further, we show that information design can go beyond and achieve the “first-best”: it
can achieve the same welfare outcomes as those of centralized admission policies that observe each
user’s type, and disregard user incentives. Thus our work indicates that information design can play
a promising role in improving welfare for congested social services.
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A. Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is immediate for λ< 1, since the sets ΠAP and ΠSM are compact (under the
topology of weak convergence). To see this, note that for any pi ∈ΠAP, by Lemma 5 (stated at the end of this
section), we have pik ≤ λkpi0 for all k. Hence, for λ < 1, Prohorov’s theorem directly implies compactness of
ΠAP and ΠSM.
Suppose λ= 1. Let ΠfiAP and ΠfiSM denote the set of admission policies and signaling mechanisms that are
not Pareto-dominated by the full-information mechanism. We again use Prohorov’s theorem to show that
these sets are relatively compact, from which the existence will follow by noticing that any Pareto-dominant
distribution is the maximizer of W (pi, θ) over these sets.
Fix an  > 0. Let WL(fi) and WH(fi) denote the welfare of each type under the full information mechanism.
Next, fix some large enough N to be chosen later. Consider a steady-state distribution pi ∈ΠAP. We have the
following expressions:
WH(pi) = λH
∞∑
n=0
pinuH(n)
≤ λHuH(0)
(∑
n≤N
pin
)
+λHuH(N + 1)
(∑
n>N
pin
)
≤ λHuH(0) +λHuH(N + 1)
(∑
n>N
pin
)
.
where the first inequality follows from Assumption 1 and the second follows because uH(0)> 0. Similarly, we
have
WL(pi) =
∞∑
n=0
(pin+1−λHpin)uL(n)
=−λHpi0uL(0) +
∞∑
n=1
pin(uL(n− 1)−λHuL(n))
≤
∞∑
n=1
pin(uL(n− 1)−λHuL(n)).
Now, by Assumption 1, we have that uL(n− 1)−λHuL(n) = ∆uL(n− 1) +λLuL(n) is strictly decreasing in n
(as λL > 0). Thus, by a similar argument, we obtain
WL(pi)≤ (uL(0)−λHuL(1)) + (uL(N)−λHuL(N + 1))
(∑
n>N
pin
)
.
Now, choose N large enough that min{uH(N + 1), uL(N)−λHuL(N + 1))}<−1/2. Then, we have
WH(pi)≤ λHuH(0)− 1
2
(∑
n>N
pin
)
WL(pi)≤ (uL(0)−λHuL(1))− 1
2
(∑
n>N
pin
)
.
This implies that if
∑
n>N
pin > , then for small enough  > 0, WL(pi) <WL(fi) and WH(pi) <WH(fi), and
hence the distribution pi is Pareto-dominated by the full information mechanism fi.
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Thus, we conclude that the set of distributions ΠfiAP has the property that for any  > 0, there exists an
N such that
∑
n>N
pin ≤  for any pi ∈ ΠfiAP. Using Prohorov’s theorem, we then obtain that this set of
distributions is relatively compact (under weak topology). Finally, the set ΠfiSM, being a subset of ΠfiAP, is also
relatively compact. The proof then follows by observing that a maximizer of W (pi, θ) over the closure of ΠfiAP
(and, separately, ΠfiSM) exists and is Pareto-dominant within ΠAP (resp., ΠSM). 
Proof of Lemma 3. We prove the statement for pi ∈ΠSM that is Pareto-dominant with the class ΠSM. The
proof of the corresponding statement for pi ∈ΠAP is analogous and is omitted.
The proof proceeds by showing the contrapositive. Let pi ∈ΠSM have a threshold structure, with a threshold
x>mfi, where x=m+a with m∈N0 and a∈ [0,1]. Thus, we have pik+1 = λpik for all k <m, and pik+1 = λHpik
for all k >m. Note, we allow m=∞, which captures the case where pik+1 = λpik for all k ∈N0. Observe that
x>mfi implies that m≥mfi, and hence the threshold structure of pi implies pimfi > 0.
Consider pˆi defined as follows:
pˆik =
{
1
Z
pik if k≤mfi;
1
Z
λk−mfiH pimfi if k >mfi,
where Z =
∑
k≤mfi pik +pimfi
∑
k>mfi
λk−mfiH . Using the detailed balance constraints in Lemma 1, it follows that
pik ≥ λk−mfiH pimfi for all k >mfi. Thus, as
∑
k
pik = 1, we have Z ≤ 1.
Next, consider
J(pˆi) =
∞∑
k=1
(pˆik+1−λHpˆik)uL(k) = 1
Z
∑
k<mfi
(pik+1−λHpik)uL(k)
>
1
Z
∞∑
k=1
(pik+1−λHpik)uL(k) = 1
Z
· J(pi).
Here, the inequality follows from the fact that uL(k)< 0 for k ≥mfi and that pimfi+1 − λHpimfi = λL min{x−
mfi,1}pimfi > 0. Since J(pi)≥ 0 and Z ≤ 1, we obtain that J(pˆi)> J(pi)≥ 0. Hence, the obedience constraint
(JOIN) holds for pˆi. Moreover, the threshold structure of pi implies
L(pˆi) =
∞∑
k=1
(λpˆik− pˆik+1)uL(k) =
∞∑
k=mfi
(λpˆik− pˆik+1)uL(k)≤ 0.
Thus, the obedience constraint (LEAVE) also holds for pˆi. Hence, we obtain that pˆi ∈ΠSM.
Furthermore, for `≤mfi, we have
∑
k≤` pˆik =
1
Z
·∑
k≤` pik. Since, Z ≤ 1, this implies
∑
k≤` pˆik ≥
∑
k≤` pik for
all `≤mfi. For ` >mfi, after some algebra, we obtain∑
k≤`
pˆik−
∑
k≤`
pik =
1
Z
(∑
q≤mfi
∑
k>`
piq
(
pik−pimfiλk−mfiH
)
+
`∑
q=mfi+1
∑
k>`
pimfiλ
q−mfi
H
(
pik−λk−qH piq
))
.
Using Lemma 5, we have pik ≥ piqλk−qH for all k > q. Thus, the right-hand side is non-negative, and hence,∑
k≤` pˆik ≥
∑
k≤` pik for ` >mfi as well. Together, this implies that pˆi is stochastically dominated by pi. Since
uH(k) is strictly decreasing in k, we have
WH(pˆi) = λH
∞∑
k=0
pˆikuH(k)≥ λH
∞∑
k=0
pikuH(k) =WH(pi).
Finally, since WL(pˆi) = J(pˆi) > J(pi) = WL(pi), we conclude that pˆi ∈ ΠSM Pareto-dominates pi, and hence pi
cannot be Pareto-dominant within ΠSM. 
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Lemma 5. For any pi ∈ΠAP, and for any k > q ∈N0, we have pik ≥ λk−qH piq and pik ≤ λk−qpiq. In particular,
when λH > 0, for any pi ∈ΠAP, we have pik ∈ (0,1) for all k ∈N0.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the detailed balance constraints in Lemma 1. 
B. Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that 0<WL(fi)≤WL(sm) simply follows from the observation that fi is
a feasible signaling mechanism. Thus its welfare is a lower bound on that achieved by the optimal signaling
mechanism sm.
Next, we proveWL(sm)≤ αfiWL(fi). The proof consists of two steps. In the first step, we show xsm ≥mfi−1,
where xsm ∈R+ is the threshold of the sm mechanism. We prove this by showing that the second obedience
constraint, (LEAVE), will not be satisfied if the threshold is below mfi− 1. More precisely, let pism denote the
steady-state distribution corresponding to sm mechanism, and let xsm =m+ a where m ∈N0 and a ∈ [0,1).
Then
L(pism) =
{
λLpim(1− a) ·uL(m) +λLpim+1 ·uL(m+ 1), if a> 0;
λLpim ·uL(m), if a= 0.
Here, the first case follows from the fact that, under the optimal signaling mechanism sm, a user is asked to
leave with probability 1− a if the queue length equals m, which occurs with probability pim, and asked to
leave with probability 1 if the queue-length equals m+ 1, which occurs with probability pim+1. The second
case follows analogously.
Since pism ∈ΠSM, we have L(pism)≤ 0. This condition, along with the fact that uL(·) is strictly decreasing,
forces uL(m+ 1)< 0 if a > 0, and uL(m)≤ 0 and uL(m+ 1)< 0 if a= 0. In both cases, we have m+ 1≥mfi,
and hence xsm =m+a≥mfi−1 +a≥mfi−1. Further, from Lemma 3, we have xsm ≤mfi. Putting these two
together, we obtain
xsm ∈ [mfi− 1,mfi].
Since WL(x) is monotone between integers, we thus obtain that
WL(sm)≤max{WL(mfi− 1),WL(mfi)}.
Now,
WL(mfi− 1) =
∑mfi−2
n=0 λ
n
LuL(n)∑mfi−1
n=0 λ
n
L
≤
∑mfi−1
n=0 λ
n
LuL(n)∑mfi−1
n=0 λ
n
L
=
( ∑mfi
n=0 λ
n
L∑mfi−1
n=0 λ
n
L
)
·
∑mfi−1
n=0 λ
n
LuL(n)∑mfi
n=0 λ
n
L
= αfi ·WL(fi).
Here, in the inequality follows from the fact that uL(mfi − 1) ≥ 0, and the first and the second equalities
follow from the definition of a threshold mechanism. In the final equality, we have used the definition of αfi.
Thus, taken together, we obtain WL(sm)≤ αfiWL(fi). The statement of the proposition follows after noting
that αfi ≤ 1 + 1mfi for all λL ≤ 1. 
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Proof of Lemma 4. First note that an arriving type-L user has no information about the queue length.
Therefore, a symmetric equilibrium strategy consists of a probability p with which she joins the queue. Let
pin(p) be the steady-state distribution corresponding to such a strategy. By detailed balance constraint, we
have:
pin+1(p) = (λH + pλL)pin(p), n∈N0
This implies pin(p) = (1−λLp−λH)(λLp+λH)n, n∈N0. A type-L users chooses p that maximizes her utility.
This gives rise to the three cases listed in the statement of the lemma. 
The following lemma is repeatedly used in the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 6. 1. The welfare function WH(x) is strictly decreasing in x∈R+.
2. The welfare function WL(x) is unimodal over integers, initially increasing up to a maximum, and then
decreasing. Furthermore, WL(x) is monotone between consecutive integers.
Proof. The proof of the first statement follows from the fact the steady-state distribution under the
threshold policy x is stochastically dominated by that under the threshold policy xˆ > x. Since uH(k) is strictly
decreasing in k, we thus obtain that WH(x)>WH(xˆ).
For the second statement, note that for x=m+ a, where m∈N0 and a∈ [0,1), we have
WL(x) = λL · 1∑m
k=0 λ
k + λ
m(λH+aλL)
1−λH
·
(
m−1∑
k=0
λkuL(k) + aλ
muL(m)
)
.
Since this is of the form α+βa
γ+δa
, where α,β, γ, δ are independent of a, we obtain that WL(m+ a) is monotone
in a ∈ [0,1). Thus, we conclude that WL(x) is monotone between consecutive integers. It is straightforward
to verify that WL(x) is continuous, and hence the maximum of WL(x) is attained at an integer.
Next, to show unimodality, we split the analysis into two cases corresponding to λ = 1 and λ < 1. For
λ= 1, we obtain
WL(m) = λL
∑m−1
k=0 uL(k)
m+ 1 + λH
1−λH
= λL
m− cm(m+ 1)/2
m+ 1 + λH
1−λH
.
Now, considering for a moment that m takes values over the reals, we obtain
∂2WL(m)
∂m2
=−λL (1−λH) (cλH + 2(1−λH))
(1 +m(1−λH))3
≤ 0.
Hence, this implies that ∂(WL(m+1)−WL(m))
∂m
≤ 0, which further implies that WL(m+ 1)−WL(m)≤WL(m)−
WL(m − 1). Thus, we obtain that WL(m) has decreasing differences. Further, we have WL(1) −WL(0) =
(1−c)(1−λH)λL
2−λH > 0, and WL
(
2
c
)−WL ( 2c − 1)=− c(1−λH)c+2(1−λH) < 0. Thus, we obtain WL(m) is unimodular, initially
increasing up to a maximum and then decreasing.
For λ< 1, note that we have
WL(m) =
(1−λH) (c(1−λ)λmm− c(1−λm) + (1−λ)(1−λm))
(1−λ) (1−λm(λ−λH)−λH)
Again, considering for a moment that m takes values over the reals, we obtain
∂WL(m)
∂m
=
λm (1−λH)
(1−λm(λ−λH)−λH)2
(c(1−λH)m log (λ)− cλm (λ−λH)− cλH + log(λ)(c+λ− 1) + c) ,
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Note that the leading factor on the right-hand side is positive. Let A(m) denote the term inside the paren-
thesis. That is, we have
A(m) = c(1−λH)m log (λ)− cλm (λ−λH)− cλH + log(λ)(c+λ− 1) + c,
and hence,
∂A(m)
∂m
= c (1−λm(λ−λH)−λH) log (λ)≤ 0.
Thus, A(m) is decreasing in m. Further, A(0) = c(1−λ+ log(λ)) + log(λ)(λ− 1)≥ 1−λ+λ log(λ)≥ 0, and
limm→∞
A(m)
m
= c(1− λH) log(λ)< 0. Thus, we obtain that ∂WL(m)∂m is decreasing in m, with it being initially
positive, and eventually negative. This implies that WL(m) is unimodal, increasing up to a maximum and
then decreasing. This concludes the proof. 
C. Proofs from Section 5
In this section, we provide the proofs for results in Section 5. The following lemma is used in the proof of
Proposition 2.
Lemma 7. For x∈R+, the function L(x) is decreasing as long as it is non-negative, subsequent to which
it stays negative. Formally, we have L(x)≤max{inf0≤u≤xL(u),0}.
Proof. Consider a threshold policy x=m+ a, where m∈N0 and a∈ [0,1). We have
L(x) =
∞∑
k=0
(λpik−pik+1)uL(k)
= λLpim(1− a)uL(m) +λL
∞∑
k=1
pim+kuL(m+ k)
= λL · λ
m(1− a)uL(m) +λm(λH +λLa)
∑∞
k=1 λ
k−1
H uL(m+ k)∑m
k=0 λ
k + λ
m(λH+aλL)
1−λH
.
Since this is a ratio of two linear functions of a, we obtain that it monotone in a, and hence, it suffices to
analyze L(x) as a function over integers. After some algebra, we have
1
λL
L(m) =
λm
∑∞
k=0 λ
k
HuL(m+ k)∑m
k=0 λ
k + λ
mλH
1−λH
=
λm
∑∞
k=0 λ
k
H∑m
k=0 λ
k + λ
mλH
1−λH
·
∑∞
k=0 λ
k
HuL(m+ k)∑∞
k=0 λ
k
H
.
Now, both factors on the right-hand side are decreasing in m. Note that the first factor is positive. If L(m)
is non-negative, then the second factor is non-negative, and hence L(m+ 1)−L(m)≤ 0. On the other hand,
if L(m)< 0, then the second factor is negative, and since it is decreasing, we obtain L(m+ 1)< 0 as well.
Thus, we conclude that L(x) is decreasing as long as it is non-negative, subsequent to which it stays negative.
Formally, we have L(x)≤max{inf0≤u≤xL(y),0}. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First, suppose λH ∈ [1− c,1], and fix a θ ∈ [0,1]. Consider the admission policy
ap(θ). Since the arrival rate of type-H users is so high, even if no type-L users join the queue, the welfare of
type-H users is non-positive. If ap(θ) makes some type-L users to join the queue, then the welfare of type-H
users can only be lower. Thus, we obtain thatWH(ap(θ))≤ 0. Furthermore, under ap(θ), the welfare of type-L
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users must be non-negative, for otherwise, ap(θ) is Pareto-dominated by the admission policy that keeps all
type-L users from joining the queue. Thus, we obtainWL(ap(θ))≥ 0. Thus, we have J(ap(θ)) =WL(ap(θ))≥ 0.
Furthermore, we have
WH(ap(θ)) =
λH
λL
(J(ap(θ)) +L(ap(θ))) .
Since WH(ap(θ)) ≤ 0 and J(ap(θ)) ≥ 0, we obtain that L(ap(θ)) ≤ 0. This implies that ap(θ) satisfies both
the obedience constraints (JOIN) and (LEAVE). Thus, we obtain that ap(θ)∈ΠSM, and hence ap(θ) = sm(θ).
Next, suppose λH < 1− c. Suppose there exists a θ1 ∈ (0,1) with ap(θ1) = sm(θ1), and consider θ2 > θ1.
First, note that the threshold of ap(θ) is always an integer for all θ, which we denote by map(θ). Now, we
have
θ1WL(ap(θ1)) + (1− θ1)WH(ap(θ1))≥ θ1WL(ap(θ2)) + (1− θ1)WH(ap(θ2))
θ2WL(ap(θ2)) + (1− θ2)WH(ap(θ2))≥ θ2WL(ap(θ1)) + (1− θ2)WH(ap(θ1)),
After some algebra, we obtain
WL(ap(θ2))−WL(ap(θ1))≥WH(ap(θ2))−WH(ap(θ1)).
Supposemap(θ1)>map(θ2). This implies thatWH(ap(θ2))>WH(ap(θ1)), by Lemma 6. The preceding inequal-
ity would then imply WL(ap(θ2))−WL(ap(θ1))> 0. However, this would imply that ap(θ2) Pareto-dominates
ap(θ1), leading to a contradiction. Thus, we obtain that map(θ1)≤map(θ2), i.e., map(θ) is weakly increasing
in θ.
Now, since sm(θ1) = ap(θ1), we have L(map(θ1))≤ 0. Since map(θ2)≥map(θ1), by Lemma 7, we then obtain
that L(map(θ2))≤ 0. Also, by Lemma 3, we obtain that map(θ2)≤mfi, and hence J(map(θ2))≥ 0. Together,
we obtain that ap(θ2)∈ΠSM, and hence sm(θ2) = ap(θ2).
Thus, we obtain that if ap(θ1) = sm(θ1) for some θ1, then the same holds for all θ2 > θ1. Thus, using the
continuity of W (pi, θ) with respect to θ, we obtain the set of all θ for which ap(θ) = sm(θ) takes the form
[θ(λH),1] for some θ(λH)≥ 0. Finally, we note that θ(λH)> 0, since for θ= 0, the admission policy makes all
type-L users take the outside option, which cannot be implemented as a signaling mechanism because, from
Theorem 5, the leave condition does not hold for λH < 1− c. 
The proof of Proposition 3 uses the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Consider a threshold mechanism with threshold x=m+a where m∈N0 and a∈ [0,1). Suppose
λ= λH +λL = 1. Then, under Assumption 2, we have
WL(x) =
λL
m+ a+ 1/λL
(
m− cm(m+ 1)
2
+ a(1− c(m+ 1))
)
WH(x) =
(1−λL)
m+ a+ 1/λL
(
m+ 1− c (m+ 1)(m+ 2)
2
+
(λLa+ 1−λL)(−c+λL− cλL− cmλL)
λ2L
)
L(x) =
−c+λL− cmλL− cλLa
λL(m+ a+ 1/λL)
.
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Proof. For a threshold mechanism with threshold x=m+a as in the lemma statement, the steady state
distribution is given by
pin =
{
pi0 for n≤m;
(λLa+λH)λ
n−(m+1)
H pi0 for n≥m+ 1.
The normalization constraint
∑∞
n=0 pin = 1 gives
pi0 =
(
m+ 1 +
∞∑
n=m+1
(λLa+λH)
n−m
)−1
=
(
m+ 1 +
λLa+ 1−λL
1−λH
)−1
=
1
m+ a+ 1/λL
.
We therefore have
WL(x) =
∞∑
n=0
(pin+1−λHpin)uL(n)
=
m−1∑
n=0
(1−λH)pi0(1− c(n+ 1)) + (λLa+λH−λH)pi0(1− c(m+ 1))
= λLpi0
(
m−1∑
n=0
1− c(n+ 1) + a(1− c(m+ 1))
)
=
λL
m+ a+ 1/λL
(
m− cm(m+ 1)
2
+ a(1− c(m+ 1))
)
,
and
WH(x) =
∞∑
n=0
λHpinuH(n)
= λHpi0
m∑
n=0
(1− c(n+ 1)) +λH(λLa+λH)pi0
∞∑
n=m+1
(1−λL)n−(m+1)(1− c(n+ 1))
= λHpi0
(
m+ 1− c (m+ 1)(m+ 2)
2
)
+λH(λLa+λH)pi0
−c+λL− cλL− cmλL
λ2L
=
(1−λL)
m+ a+ 1/λL
(
m+ 1− c (m+ 1)(m+ 2)
2
+
(λLa+ 1−λL)(−c+λL− cλL− cmλL)
λ2L
)
.
Furthermore,
L(x) =
∞∑
n=0
(pin−pin+1)uL(n)
= (1− (λLa+λH))pi0(1− c(m+ 1)) +
∞∑
n=m+1
(λLa+λH)pi0λ
n−(m+1)
H (1−λH)(1− c(n+ 1))
= λL(1− a)pi0(1− c(m+ 1)) +λL(λLa+ 1−λL)pi0 (−c+λL− cλL− cmλL)
λ2L
=
λL
m+ a+ 1/λL
(
(1− a)(1− c(m+ 1)) + (λLa+ 1−λL)(−c+λL− cλL− cmλL)
λ2L
)
=
−c+λL− cmλL− cλLa
λL(m+ a+ 1/λL)
.
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. For each θ ∈ {0,1/2,1} and nonnegative integer k, we will derive a condition on
λL such that xap(θ) = xsm(θ) = k. Since xap(θ) is always an integer, the condition on λL such that xap(θ) = xap(θ)
is the union on such conditions over all k ∈N0.
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By Lemma 6, for k ≥ 1, the necessary and sufficient condition for xap(θ) = k is W (k, θ)≥W (k− 1, θ) and
W (k, θ)≥W (k+1, θ). For k= 0, the necessary and sufficient condition isW (0, θ)≥W (1, θ). ap(θ) and sm(θ)
are the same if and only if the leave condition holds: L(k)≤ 0. Together, these are the necessary and sufficient
conditions for xap(θ) = xsm(θ) = k.
Using expressions from Lemma 8, L(k)≤ 0 is equivalent to −c+λL− ckλL ≤ 0 or (1− ck)λL ≤ c. We have
WL(k) =
λL
k+ 1/λL
[
1− ck(k+ 1)
2
]
WL(k)−WL(k− 1) = λ
2
L(2− 2ck+ ckλL− ck2λL)
2(1 + kλL)(1−λL + kλL)
WH(k)−WH(k− 1) = ckλL(1−λL)(λL− 2− kλL)
2(1 + kλL)(1−λL + kλL)
In particular, WL(1)−WL(0) = λ2L(1− c)/(1 +λL) and WH(1)−WH(0) =−cλL(1−λL)/(1 +λL).
1. We consider the case θ= 0 here. For k≥ 1, we note that W (k,1)−W (k−1,1) =WH(k)−WH(k−1)< 0
always, so the condition cannot be satisfied. For k= 0, the conditionW (0,1)−W (1,1)≥ 0 is always satisfied,
and the condition L(k) =L(0)≤ 0 gives λL ≤ c. We conclude that xap(0) = xsm(0) if and only if λL ∈ [0, c].
2. We consider the case θ = 1/2 here. For k = 0, we have W (0,1/2) −W (1,1/2) = 1
2
(WL(1) −WL(0) +
WH(1)−WH(0))≥ 0 if and only if cλL(1−)λL−λ2L(1−c)≥ 0 if and only if λL ≤ c. The condition L(k) =L(0)≤ 0
also implies λL ≤ c.
For k≥ 1,W (k,1/2)−W (k−1,1/2)≥ 0 if and only if λL(2−2ck+ckλL−ck2λL)+ck(1−λL)(λL−2−kλL)≥ 0
if and only if (2− ck(k− 1))λL ≥ 2ck. Therefore, the ap(1/2) conditions become (2− ck(k− 1))λL ≥ 2ck and
(2− c(k+ 1)k)λL ≤ 2c(k+ 1), and the leave obedient condition is (1− ck)λL ≤ c.
For k= 1, we get 2λL ≥ 2c, (2− 2c)λL ≤ 4c, (1− c)λL ≤ c. Together this gives c≤ λL ≤ c/(1− c). For c≥ 1/2,
this gives λL ∈ [c,1]. Henceforth we assume c < 1/2.
We will show that k ≥ 2 is not possible. First we show that c < 1/k. This is true by assumption for k = 2,
and for k≥ 3, the condition (2− ck(k−1))λL ≥ 2ck implies that c < 2/k(k−1)≤ 1/k. For k≥ 3, we therefore
have 2ck
2−ck(k−1) ≤ λL ≤ c1−ck . The inequality c1−ck ≥ 2ck2−ck(k−1) gives c≥ 2(k−1)k(k+1) ≥ 2k(k−1) , a contradiction. For
k= 2, if c≥ 1/3, we get c≥ 1−2c, so c > (1−2c)λL, a contradiction, and if c < 1/3, we have 2c1−c ≤ λL ≤ 3c1−3c ,
but 3c
1−3c <
2c
1−c , a contradiction.
To conclude, we have the characterization
k= 0, λL ∈ [0, c]
k= 1, λL ∈
[
c,min
(
c
1− c ,1
)]
3. We consider the case θ = 1 here. For k ≥ 1, the conditions are ck(k − 1)λL ≤ 2− 2ck, c(k + 1)kλL ≥
2 − 2c(k + 1), (1 − ck)λL ≤ c. We have 2 − 2ck ≥ 0, so c < 1/k. For k = 0, we have W (0,1) −W (1,1) =
WL(0)−WL(1)< 0 always, so k= 0 is not possible. Let n= b1/cc, then 1≤ k≤ n.
For k= n, the condition c(k+ 1)λL ≥ 2−2c(k+ 1) is true automatically since the right hand side is negative,
so the conditions reduce to 0≤ c≤min
(
c
1−cn ,
2−2cn
cn(n−1)
)
.
For 1≤ k≤ n, we have
2− 2c(k+ 1)
c(k+ 1)k
≤ λL ≤min
(
2− 2ck
ck(k− 1) ,
c
1− ck
)
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For k < k∗, the inequality c
1−ck ≥ 2−2c(k+1)c(k+1)k is false, so it is not possible. For k = n, the lower bound is
negative, so the resulting lower bound for λL at k = n is in fact zero. For k = n,n− 1, . . . , k∗ + 1, So k∗ ≤
k ≤ n. For k∗ + 1 ≤ k ≤ n, 2−2ck
ck(k−1) ≤ c1−c(k−1) < c1−ck , where the first inequality comes from the fact that
k− 1≥ k∗ satisfies the inequality defining k∗. Therefore, the upper bound is 2−2ck
ck(k−1) , which exactly matches
the lower bound for λL at k− 1. Therefore, the union of the valid ranges of λL for k = n,n− 1, . . . , k∗ gives[
0,min
(
2−2ck∗
ck∗(k∗−1) ,
c
1−ck∗
)]
. 
